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In R v Jewell, Darren Jewell (J) had driven to the Essex home of his colleague Anthony 
Prickett (P) in May 2011, ostensibly to pick him up for work. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheŶ J aƌƌiǀed at P’s 
house, J shot P at point blank range, twice, with his fatheƌ’s shotgun, first in the abdomen 
and then in the head. J then fled the scene but was arrested that afternoon after the police 
forced his car off the road south of Edinburgh. The car contained a loaded home-made ͞zip͟ 
gun capable of firing .22 ammunition, eight rounds of spare ammunition, and what the 
CƌoǁŶ desĐƌiďed as a ͞suƌǀiǀal kit͟: a ƌuĐksaĐk holdiŶg spaƌe Đlothes, a teŶt, several  knives, 
two cans of CS gas, a passport, a driving licence and a chequebook. J was charged with 
murder and appeared before a judge and jury at Chelmsford Crown Court in January 2012. 
The Crown case was that it was a premeditated killing. J pleaded not guilty to murder on the 
basis of lack of mens rea. In police interviews, J claimed that various unknown people 
(although P may have been one of them) had intimidated him, and that P had insinuated 
that he (J) oŶlǇ had ͞tǁo daǇs left͟ to liǀe. J asserted that the evening before the shooting 
he had gone to his father’s house and borrowed the shotgun and ammunition. J had stayed 
up all night with the shotgun and had written to neighbours leaving his keys and asking 
them to feed his cat, before leaving home that morning in his van. He admitted shooting P, 
but denied doing so intentionally; he had shot P ͞as if iŶ a dƌeaŵ͟ (at [4]). After the 
shooting, J fled the scene, disposed of the shotgun, ran to his father’s house and took his 
fatheƌ’s car, and drove to Scotland where he intended to live before committing suicide. At 
his trial, J maintained that he had not intentionally shot P. He told that jury that when he got 
out of his ǀaŶ outside P’s house, ͞I did it because I lost control. I could not control my 
actions. I could not think straight. My head was fucked up. It was like an injection in the 
head, an explosion in my head.͟ (at [19]). The trial judge considered whether to direct the 
jury on the Loss of Control defence, but in the end held that there was insufficient evidence 
of J having lost his self-control to leave the defence to the jury. J was convicted of murder 
and appealed, contending that the trial judge should have directed the jury on the defence 
of Loss of Control. 
 
In R v Workman, Ian Workman (W), stabbed his estranged wife of 35 years, Sue Workman 
(S), to death in the kitchen of their farmhouse in Lancashire, in April 2011. He was charged 
with murder and appeared before Mr Justice Christopher Clarke and a jury at Preston Crown 
Court in December 2011. The Crown case was that W had deliberately stabbed S to death 
͞ďeĐause she ǁas defǇiŶg hiŵ͟ (at [17]). The defence case was that “ had ͞aĐĐideŶtallǇ͟ 
stabbed herself to death in the course of a struggle. In police interview, W asserted that he 
had returned to the farmhouse to collect some belongings. They began quarrelling and W 
criticised “’s treatment of their eldest son. Shortly afterwards, S had ͞eǆploded iŶ aŶgeƌ͟ (at 
[9]) and charged at W holding a kitchen knife in her right hand. W had managed to avoid the 
attack and got behind S, with his left arm around her neck and his right hand holding her 
right arm or wrist. At some point in the struggle, S had ͞aĐĐideŶtallǇ͟ staďďed heƌself iŶ the 
heart with the knife. The jury convicted W of murder. He appealed, contending inter alia 
that the trial judge, Clarke J, should have directed the jury on the defence of Loss of Control. 
 
In R v Barnsdale-Quean, Stephen Barnsdale-Quean (B) was charged with the murder of his 
wife Chantelle Barnsdale-Quean (C) at their flat in South Yorkshire. He appeared before a 
judge and jury at Sheffield Crown Court.  The Crown case was that B had strangled C to 
death with a chain which had been tightened by using a rolling pin as a tourniquet, after 
which B had stabbed himself in the stomach and inflicted other injuries on himself in order 
to make it appear that C had attacked him, and had then called the emergency services. 
During police interviews, B claimed that C had attacked him before committing suicide by 
self-strangulation. The juƌǇ ƌejeĐted B’s ǀeƌsion of events and he was convicted of murder. 
He appealed, contending that the trial judge, His Honour Judge Goose QC, should have 
directed the jury on the defence of Loss of Control. (The trial judge had directed the jury on 
B’s alteƌŶatiǀe defeŶĐe of suiĐide paĐt, ďut this ǁas ƌejeĐted ďǇ the juƌǇ.Ϳ 
 
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEALS, there was insufficient evidence of Loss of Control in all 
three cases. In Jewell, Rafferty LJ said: 
 
This bore every hallmark of a pre-planned, cold-ďlooded eǆeĐutioŶ… The eǀideŶĐe that 
this was a planned execution is best described as overwhelming... As to the first 
component, whether there is evidence of loss of control, sufficiency of evidence is 
bound to suggest more than minimum evidence to establish the facts… The judge 
balanced the undisputed evidence against what was accurately described as no more 
than a bare assertion by [J] ͞I lost ĐoŶtƌol͟. His fiŶdiŶg ǁas plaiŶlǇ opeŶ to hiŵ aŶd is 
unimpugnable. (at [43], [45], [48] and [49]) 
 
In Workman, Davis LJ said: 
 
At Ŷo stage did [J] adǀaŶĐe a defeŶĐe of loss of ĐoŶtƌol… [A] judge is required to leave 
such a defence to the jury, whether or not it is positively part of the defence case, if 
suffiĐieŶt eǀideŶĐe is adduĐed to ƌaise the issue. It is Ŷot a ŵatteƌ foƌ the tƌial judge’s 
͞disĐƌetioŶ͟. The question is what is nowadays modishly called a binary question: 
either the defence should be left or it should not be left, yes or no… IŶ ouƌ ǀieǁ, the 
judge ǁas ĐoƌƌeĐt Ŷot to leaǀe the issue of loss of ĐoŶtƌol to the juƌǇ… Theƌe ǁas 
nothing at all in the defence case to give rise to such a defence. (at [85] – [88]) 
 
 In Barnsdale-Quean, McCombe LJ said: 
 
In the present case, as we see it, there was no such evidence [of a loss of control]. 
There was none provided by [B] in either his interviews or with the police or his own 
evidence. His case was that he was attacked by [C] and had no recollection of what 
happened thereafter. He was not saying that he had lost control at any stage. There 
was no objective evidence of loss of control in any other evidence either. There was in 
fact just no evidence upon which a jury, properly directed, could have concluded there 
had been a loss of self-control on the part of [B] at all. To have concluded that there 
had been would have been mere speculation without evidential foundation. (at [27]) 
 
COMMENTARY 
The statutory defence of Loss of Control was introduced with effect from 4 October 2010 by 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (the 2009 Act), s. 54(1), replacing the common law 
defence of provocation, which was simultaneously abolished by s. 56(1) of the 2009 Act. The 
new defence is a special and partial defence in that it is only available to those charged with 
murder and, if successful, leads to a conviction for manslaughter rather than an acquittal (s. 
54(7) of the 2009 Act). There are three elements to the defence: a loss of control 
(s.54(1)(a)), a qualifying trigger (s. 54(1)(b)) and a normal person test (s. 54(1)(c)). In cases 
where the defence is raised, it is the task of the prosecution to disprove one or more of the 
elements in order to secure a murder conviction – but only once the accused has adduced 
͞sufficient evidence͟. For present purposes, the key provisions are s. 54(5) and (6) of the 
2009 Act, which provide as follows: 
 
(5) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with 
respect to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is 
satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
 
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue 
with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial 
judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might 
apply. 
 
The leadiŶg Đase oŶ the suďjeĐt of ͞sufficient evidence͟ is R v Clinton; Parker; Evans [2012] 
EWCA Crim 2, [2013] QB 1; [2012] 3 WLR 515 (see Wake, N, Loss of control beyond sexual 
infidelity, (2013) 76(3) J Crim L 193). In that case, Lord Judge CJ said (emphasis added): 
 
Unless there is evidence sufficient to raise the issue of loss of control it should be 
withdrawn from consideration by the jury... This requires a common sense judgment 
based on an analysis of all the evidence... The statutory provision is clear. If there is 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably conclude that the loss of control defence 
might apply, it must be left to the jury: if there is no such evidence, then it must be 
withdrawn. (at [45] – [47]) 
 
IŶ all thƌee Đases uŶdeƌ disĐussioŶ iŶ this Ŷote, theƌe ǁas ͞iŶsuffiĐieŶt͟ eǀideŶĐe that aŶǇ of 
the three appellants had lost their self-control, and that was enough to dispose of all three 
appeals. Indeed, in both Workman and Barnsdale-Quean there was no evidence at all. The 
decision in Jewell that the aĐĐused’s ͞ďaƌe asseƌtioŶ͟ is iŶsuffiĐieŶt eǀideŶĐe to suppoƌt a 
defence of Loss of Control echoes the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Ciccarelli [2011] 
EWCA Crim 2665, [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. 15, a case on s. 75(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(the 2003 Act). Section 75 provides that a rebuttable presumption of non-consent on the 
part of the complainant in a sex offence case will be created in certain circumstances, for 
example where the ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt is ͞asleep or otherwise unconscious͟, uŶless ͞sufficient 
evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he consented͟. On the meaning of 
͞sufficient evidence͟ in the context of the 2003 Act, Lord Judge CJ explained that this meant 
͞some evidence beyond the fanciful or speculative had to be adduced͟ (at [18]). 
 
 
Finally, in R v Clinton; Parker; Evans, Loƌd Judge CJ said that ͞Theƌe ŵust ďe suffiĐieŶt 
evidence to establish each of the iŶgƌedieŶts defiŶed iŶ seĐtioŶ ϱϰ;1Ϳ;aͿ;ďͿ;ĐͿ͟ (at [45], 
emphasis added). It is submitted that that is going too far in favour of the Crown. It is 
accepted that the defenĐe should ďe ƌeƋuiƌed to adduĐe ͞suffiĐieŶt͟ eǀideŶĐe that the 
accused lost his self-control (the first element) and that this was caused by one of the 
qualifying triggers (the second element), but not that there should be a requirement for the 
accused to adduce evidence as to the response of the normal person (the third element). It 
is right that the accused in seeking to be excused from murder liability under the 2009 Act 
should provide some (more than fanciful or speculative) evidence that he actually lost his 
self-control and that there was a valid qualifying trigger. However, to require the accused to 
pƌoǀide ͞eǀideŶĐe͟ in order to establish the third element is surely going too far.  Section 
54(1)(c) of the 2009 Act requires the jury to consider whether ͞a peƌsoŶ of D’s seǆ aŶd age, 
with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might 
haǀe ƌeaĐted iŶ the saŵe oƌ iŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ to D͟. Although it is likely that D will seek to 
adduce evidence relating to the circumstances in which the loss of control is alleged to have 
occurred, it is difficult to see how an evidential burden can be imposed on the accused in 
relation to the third element. The test imposed by s. 54(1)(c) is simply a matter for the jury 
aŶd it is uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ to eǆpeĐt the aĐĐused to adduĐe ͞eǀideŶĐe͟ to suppoƌt it. 
